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STATEMENT
The

District

Court erred by

failing to

apply the correct standard

deny the motion to suppress.

court’s decision to

when

analyzing the magistrate

addition, the District Court erred

In

in citing

to

foreign jurisdiction to justify upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, instead of relying

Idaho case law, and therefore

The

l.

District

came

to the

wrong conclusion regarding the motion

district

court recognized and applied the relevant law

above regarding reasonable suspicion and anonymous

the correct case law. Respondent’s Response

a.

The

to suppress.

Court Erred by Failing to Apply the Correct Legal Standard.

Contrary to the State’s assertion that ”the
as set forth

on

District

tips” the District

Court did not apply

Brief, p. 9.

Court Applied Invalid Case Law

When Analyzing the Appeal from

the

Magistrate Court.

The

District Court’s rationale in refusing to

overturn the magistrate’s denial of the motion to

suppress hinged on a number of federal cases that are not controlling case law
instance,

is

not even controlling under

its

449

Cortez,

Malcolm
3,1

1;

is

v.

v.

Malcolm, 891 F.2d 296, *2

To

by the

rely

Miranda-Soto/oongo, 827 F.3d 663

is

on such

it

appears nowhere
State

v.

In

value, but

District

amounts to suspicious
in U.$. v.

Court

the sentence from Malcolm: ”The test

Sokolow and

broad range of what

was used by the

announced standard

is

sufficiently

need not be absolutely

needed to

District

activity justifying
is

when making

v.

v.

a decision in this

in

is

is

less’

is

an error

not whether the questionable

considering the ’totality of the

an investigatory stop.” This statement

is

whether the

a

Seventh

Circuit case,

cf.

driving pattern
.

which may be used for persuasive

Court as the rule of law for Idaho. The specific objection to this
in

the face of ambiguity

is

permissible so long

probable that the observed conduct suggests unlawful activity.
certain;

evidence’ and ’obviously
is it

and United States

inherently contradictory to applicable Idaho case law;

the sentence: ”[A] stop conducted

justify a traffic stop

Cortez, nor

1989); United States

can be described as normal driving behavior.”’)

addition, Miranda-Sotolongo

remain

(7th Cir.);

of the federal prohibition on the use of an unpublished decision

Neal, 159 Idaho, 439, 443, 362 P.3d 514, 518 (2015) (”the test

falls outside ’the

it

in light

consistent with innocent behavior, but whether,

circumstances,’

(9th Cir.

an unpublished decision and has no precedential value under Ninth Circuit Rule 36—

District Court. Specifically,

conduct

one

418 (1981).

and therefore should not have been considered by the

case.

as

United States

U.S. 411,

in

designated federal jurisdiction. Court Appellate Record, pg.

111—12. Those four cases are United States

Sokolow, 490 U.S.

Idaho, and

in

.

.An

officer

without specifying mathematical probabilities, the degree of suspicion

is

’considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the

than the needed probable cause.” This statement does not appear

the applicable standard for these facts. See

1

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/rules/rules.htm

/d.,

in

supra. Moreover, a persuasive rule from

anotherjurisdiction

not appropriate for stating the rule of law

is

in this jurisdiction,

though

could be

it

used for analysis or comparison.

However, the
in

Court quoted from these two cases and applied the statements of the law

District

these two cases as though the persuasive authority of those cases was mandatory authority.

Therefore, the District Court erred

The
could lead

on the ambiguity of

analysis based

— and the

appellant asserts has

situations that people face

in life

investigating a criminal offense

meaning

Constitution has no

protections

may come

In

a situation

in this

as there

is

is

then

is

particularly troubling, as such a standard

case led — to an erroneous outcome. Nearly

are ambiguous, and

where there

into play.

wisdom and experience
Moreover,

analyzing the magistrate’s decision.

in

an officer

if

is

allowed to always err on the side of

work-around any time Fourth Amendment

a buiIt—in

nor

logical result,

Ct.

App.)

is

that enacted those constitutional protections.

footnote

2,

Appellate Record, pg. 113, the District Court relied on unpublished

yet another unpublished case and

contains additional facts not found
is

from

in this

a foreign jurisdiction as well,

decision

in a

appropriate based on the

is it

opinions from foreign jurisdictions rather than applying Idaho law. State
(Minn.

Amendment to the

ambiguity, then the Fourth

Such cannot be the

is

case. State

Just,

2006

WL 2616319

designated as not having precedential value and

v.

635 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn.

Dalios,

and the analysis there

wide array ofthat foreign

v.

fails

to take into account

jurisdiction’s precedent. For

Ct.

more than

v.

Brechler,

N.W.Zd 367, 368 (Minn. App. 1987). Brechler would be much more probative of the current
which also contains facts which,

To further

Commr. of Pub.

illustrate

Safety,

how

in

Idaho, would constitute

inappropriate

it is

its

own

The cases that remain
Sokolow and

412

issue than

to be applying Minnesota to this case, Kruse

reasonable, articulable suspicion, which Idaho case law squarely contradicts
in this

a single

basis for a stop.

906 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. App. 2018), states that crossing the fog

the lower courts were called upon to apply

App. 2001),

example, the Minnesota court had

previously held that the single swerve did not provide a basis for a stop. See State

Dalios,

all

in

line

v.

is

Neal, the very decision

case.

after excluding the cases that should

Cortez, but only to the extent that they

do not

have have been considered are

conflict with the standard

announced

in

Neal. Therefore, contrary to the State’s assertion, the District Court did not apply the correct case law

and

it is

necessary and appropriate that this Court apply the appropriate standards and overrule, or

order to be overruled, the denial of the motion to suppress.
b.

State

v.

Neal and State

v.

Emory Set Forth the Appropriate Standard

Neal was the appropriate case law for the

District

Court to use

denial ofthe motion to suppress, but that case does not appear

appeal. Neal details

when

specifically rejected the
line

it is

in

in its

analysis of the magistrate’s

the District Court’s decision on

appropriate for an officer to stop a citizen or resident and the Neal Court

argument that

failing to

maintain one’s lane of travel by crossing over the fog

provided reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrong-doing. The State

now

asserts that lesser

conduct—remaining inside of the Iane—is a sufficient basis to stop someone. Moreover, Neal

articulated the appropriate standard for the District Court to apply, which the District Court failed to do:

”the test

is

whether the

what can be described

driving pattern falls outside ’the broad range of

normal driving behavior.” State

v.

Neal, 159 Idaho at 443, 362 P.3d at 518 (2015), citing State

as
v.

Emory,

119 Idaho 661, 663-4.
Both the

Court analyzing the magistrate’s decision and the magistrate himself failed to

District

recognize the appropriate test to apply

in this

instance, instead choosing to focus

federal case law instead ofthe standard articulated

in

Neal. Moreover, the Neal Court,

pronouncement, looked to cases such as United States
overruled on other grounds by United States
failure to follow a perfect vector

down

on merely erroneous

v.

Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 976 (10th

in

Cir.

Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786-97 (10th,

v.

making

its

1993),
Cir.

1995)

(”[|]f

the highway or keeping one’s eyes on the road were sufficient

reasons to suspect a person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be
subject each day to an invasion oftheir privacy.”).

If

the magistrate or the District Court had analyzed this situation under Neal or Emory, or any of

the supporting case law used
to suppress the evidence
pattern. However,
driving

in

in this

whether the

does not need to have

those cases, each Court would have concluded that
case.

The government focuses

driving pattern

a perfect driving pattern.

439, 396 P.3d at 518. The Neal Court and the

is

on any flaws

in

not the end of the analysis.

The question

is:

the driving

A person

”whether the driving pattern

Emory Court both went further

whether there was an innocent explanation

District

perfect

was appropriate

broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior.” Neal, 159 Idaho at

falls outside ‘the

at

was

a great deal

it

in

their analysis in looking

for the driving behavior. Neither the magistrate nor the

Court looked for such an explanation; however, there are

many

explanations that

come

to mind,

including partial night blindness not requiring a prescription; lack of clarity on which exit the driver

is

looking for and attempting to see which exit they are approaching; and maximizing the use ofthe lane
for safety purposes.

The

ll.

District

State

As noted

Court Erred By Reviewing Evidence Not Submitted to the

Trial Court,

Which the

Now Requests This Court to Review
in

the Appellant’s Reply on appeal to the District Court:

At the suppression hearing, the state acknowledged the search was warrantless

and accepted the burden of proof. Transcript

(”TL”) p. 3, 1n. 12-16.

The

state

Pesina—to support its claim that an
exception to the warrant requirement justified Ms. Byrum’s roadside detention.

then called a single witness—Trooper

See

Tr. p. 2.

was played
Clerk’s

No

exhibits

Eric

were marked or admitted, though the dispatch audio

to refresh the trooper’s recollection. Tr.

Record on Appeal, 102-04. The Government

this appeal. Brief of

now

10-21.

has asserted that this should be used during

Respondent, 13-14. This evidence was never submitted as evidence, nor should

have been considered as a part of the appellate record

was used

p. 2; p. 16, 1n.

in

it

the appeal to the District Court. The recording

to refresh the officer’s recollection and therefore should be disregarded on appeal.

Therefore, the District Court erred by considering evidence that the state elected to not present
to the magistrate. See ICR 54 (the district court must hear appeals from the magistrate as an appellate

proceeding and a transcript must be prepared unless otherwise ordered by the
(clerk’s record

is

official

court

file

district court); ICR 54(h)

of the criminal proceeding appealed to the district court, including any

minute entries or orders together with the exhibits offered or admitted); ICR 54(k)

&

(document to be augmented

stamp or the movant

must

establish the

into appellate record

document was presented

to the

must either bear
trial

a legible filing

IAR 30(a)

court by citation to the record or transcript); ICR

54(0) and IAR 35(b)(6) (respondent’s brief shall include argument with citations to the transcript and
record).

Neither the record, transcripts nor Respondent’s Brief reflected that the state presented

evidence of the anonymous tipster’s statements during a 911

call

to the magistrate.

erred by considering this audio. Clerk’s record on Appeal, 116. Moreover, the

the Court to err by considering these statements. Respondent’s

been made
here,

it is

a part

ofthe Court’s record below, and

limited to the

Court’s analysis of

if it

has tangentially

whether the magistrate erred, and

whether there was

Brief, p. 152.

is

The

District

Government now

Court
invites

Any audio played has not

become

a part of the record

not a factual record to be used

in this

sufficient reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop

Audrey

Byrum.

CONCLUSION
The

District

Court judge erred by not applying the correct Idaho law and by considering evidence

not submitted to the magistrate court. Moreover,

in

analyzing the magistrate’s decision, the district

court applied standards and case law that are either not applicable to Idaho or not permissible for use as

precedent. Therefore,

in

analyzing the magistrate’s decision, the District Court failed to

correct conclusion regarding

whether there was

sufficient basis for

come

to the

an officer to stop Audrey Byrum.

We

therefore request that this Court reverse the decision of the District Court and order that the evidence

be suppressed.

DATED April 7, 2020.
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Craig
Attorney for Defendant— Appellant
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The audio

is

not referred to by name, nor quoted from, but bolstering the government’s argument based on

existence would not be appropriate on appeal.
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